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Note
The Cloying Use of Unallotment: Curbing
Executive Branch Appropriation Reductions
During Fiscal Emergencies
Tyler J. Siewert∗
Money is the instrument of policy and policy affects the lives
of citizens. The individual loses liberty in a real sense if that instrument is not subject to traditional constitutional constraints.
—Justice Anthony Kennedy1
On May 14, 2009, Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty
signed the Omnibus Health and Human Services Bill, a major
appropriations bill, into law.2 Because an appropriation is binding law,3 the Minnesota Constitution compelled the governor’s
faithful execution of the bill’s spending authorizations.4 But the
governor announced that he would not fully enforce the recently enacted laws due to a budgetary impasse.5 Despite his
pledge, the legislature approved a revenue bill on the final day
of its session, which secured adequate funding for the appropriations.6 After the session ended, a gubernatorial veto of the
∗ J.D. 2010, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2007, University
of North Dakota. The author extends a special thanks to Galen Robinson and
Kathleen Davis, and sends his gratitude to Professor David Schultz and the
Staff and Editors of the Minnesota Law Review for their advice and comments
on previous drafts. The author’s greatest appreciation extends to his family,
friends, and Angela, for their unwavering encouragement and support. Copyright © 2011 by Tyler J. Siewert.
1. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 451 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
2. See Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. 2010).
3. See MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
4. See id. art. V, § 3.
5. See Letter from Tim Pawlenty, Minn. Governor, to Margaret Anderson
Kelliher, Minn. Speaker of the House (May 14, 2009), available at http://www
.governor.state.mn.us/stellent/groups/public/documents/web_content/prod009516
.pdf.
6. Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 359.
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revenue bill eliminated the appropriations’ necessary funding.7
The State of Minnesota then faced a multibillion dollar deficit,8
thus paving the way for the governor’s exercise of his “unallotment” authority,9 allowing for the executive branch’s reduction
of allotted appropriations to balance the state budget.10
Nearly one year later, the Minnesota Supreme Court invalidated the governor’s unallotments for lack of an enacted balanced budget.11 The ruling vacated merely one of the governor’s
numerous appropriation reductions.12 Moreover, the court left a
crucial question unaddressed—to what extent can a governor
usurp the legislature’s constitutionally reserved appropriations
power during fiscal emergencies?
As a matter of public policy, the wisdom of discretionary
unalloting has been polemic.13 Although the term unallotment
is unique to Minnesota,14 the procedure is common—a substantial majority of state legislatures delegate a similar power to
their governors.15 As with Minnesota, economic crises in other
states have precipitated unallotments and subsequent legal
7. See FISCAL ANALYSIS DEP’T, MINN. H.R., CHAPTER 179 (HF 2323/SF
2074) CONF. COMM. REP. MAY 18, 2009—VETOED, H. 86-2323, 1st Sess., at 1
(2009), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/fiscal/files/tax09.pdf.
8. See id.
9. See MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET DEP’T, PROPOSED UNALLOTMENTS &
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS 1 (2009), available at http://www.mmb.state.mn.us/
doc/budget/unallotment/unallotment-2009.pdf.
10. See MINN. STAT. § 16A.152 subdiv. 4 (2008).
11. See Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 368.
12. See id. at 361; see also Monica Davey, Deal Follows All-Nighters in
Minnesota, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2010, at A16, available at 2010 WL 10232030
(stating that the legislature ratified most of the unallotments because little
time remained in the legislative session to redraft the budget).
13. Compare Sandy Levinson, Newsnotes from Our “Little Laboratories of
Experimentation,” BALKINIZATION (May 21, 2009, 7:44 AM), http://balkin
.blogspot.com/2009/05/newsnotes-from-our-little-laboratories.html (equating Governor Pawlenty’s unallotments to a “constitutional dictatorship”), with Press Release, Ams. for Tax Reform, Minnesota Supreme Court Decision: A Blow to
Taxpayers (May 5, 2010), available at http://www.atr.org/minnesota-supreme
-court-decision-blow-taxpayers-a4899# (commending Governor Pawlenty’s use
of unallotment as an effective “budget-cutting tool”).
14. Unallotment derives from the executive branch’s reduction of alloted
appropriations. See § 16A.152 subdiv. 4. The author uses the term broadly in
this Note to refer to circumstances where the executive branch reduces appropriations, withholds appropriations, reduces an allotment of appropriations, or
reduces public expenditures. An allotment reduction is unique from an appropriation reduction, yet the effect is the same when the result contravenes legislative spending prerogatives.
15. See JAMES J. GOSLING, BUDGETARY POLITICS IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENTS 165–67 (1992).
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challenges.16 Compared to only nine states in a seven-year span
ending in the mid-1980s,17 forty-eight states have addressed
budget deficits for fiscal year 2010 alone.18 The majority of
these states, as a result, either have experienced the repercussions of unalloting or are bracing for the impact.19 Amid these
pursuits lies an often unaddressed concern.20 The very nature
of discretionary unallotment statutes is antithetical to the
principle that legislatures, rather than the executive branch,
determine appropriation levels for the administration of public
programs and projects.21
Accordingly, unalloting often results in a disastrous legal
paradox. While governors are able to sustain balanced budgets,
their usurpation of legislatively established policy overshadows
these efforts. In addressing this predicament, this Note sets
forth a model unallotment statute, which states should either
adopt or employ as a reference when reforming their own laws.
Part I introduces the importance of separation of powers in the
budgetary process and the history of legal challenges to executive branch budget curtailments. Part II examines Governor
Pawlenty’s appropriation reductions to analyze the temporal
and constitutional limitations of unallotment statutes. Part III
introduces a model unallotment statute, which draws from the
strengths of the most legally sound unallotment laws. Specifically, this Note advocates that all unallotment laws should precisely articulate the time frame in which unalloting can occur
and either cap unallotments at a minimal percentage or require
uniform reductions across the state’s entire budget.
16. See, e.g., Folsom v. Wynn, 631 So. 2d 890, 891–92 (Ala. 1993)
(per curiam).
17. David Lubecky, Comment, The Proposed Federal Balanced Budget
Amendment: The Lesson from State Experience, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 563,
572 (1986).
18. Elizabeth McNichol et al., Recession Continues to Batter State Budgets; State Responses Could Slow Recovery, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES, 6 (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-8-08sfp.pdf.
19. Actions and Proposals to Balance FY 2011 Budgets, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=19644 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
20. Jim Rossi, State Executive Lawmaking in Crisis, 56 DUKE L.J. 237,
263 (2006) [hereinafter Rossi, Lawmaking in Crisis].
21. See D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF
DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 12
(1991) (arguing that lawmakers should not “prevent their capacity to make
policy” by delegating their appropriations power); Michael L. Buenger, Of
Money and Judicial Independence: Can Inherent Powers Protect State Courts
in Tough Fiscal Times?, 92 KY. L.J. 979, 1030 (2004) (“[T]he legislature itself
cannot delegate critical spending matters to another branch of government.”).
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I. EVOLUTION OF UNALLOTMENT
To establish social and policy objectives, legislatures appropriate revenue for the administration of public programs
and projects.22 State spending must adhere to either constitutional or statutory balanced-budget provisions.23 To ensure fiscal responsibility, the executive branch often balances the
budget with unallotment statutes.24 A state-court split exists as
to whether legislatures can authorize executive branch unallotments by abdicating the legislature’s constitutionally
granted lawmaking power.25 The recession that began in late
2008 heightened the necessity of unalloting26 and therefore exacerbated this controversy. Part I introduces the legal and policy issues raised throughout the history of unallotment in the
United States.
A. STATE BUDGET PROCESS
Constitutional and statutory criteria detail the budgetmaking procedures in each state.27 Although these criteria derive from both years of strenuous trial and error and through
the growth of democracy,28 scholars, judges, and public officials
alike have done more to muddy the roles rather than clarify the
duties of the executive and legislative branches during this
process.29 Accordingly, this section briefly introduces the legal
22. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1146–48 (4th
ed. 2007).
23. Ronald Snell, Budget-Balance Requirement, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
TAXATION & TAX POLICY 27, 27 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) (indicating that all states except Vermont must balance their budget).
24. See GOSLING, supra note 15, at 165–66.
25. Compare, e.g., State v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140 app.
at 1143 (Alaska 1987) (per curiam) (stating that Alaska’s unallotment statute
unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority), with, e.g., N.D. Council of
Sch. Adm’rs v. Sinner, 458 N.W.2d 280, 285–86 (N.D. 1990) (holding that
North Dakota’s unallotment statute does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority).
26. See Actions and Proposals to Balance FY 2011 Budgets, supra note 19.
27. See generally W. Mark Crain & James C. Miller III, Budget Process
and Spending Growth, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1021, 1024 –34 (1990) (analyzing state budget processes).
28. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and
the Line Item Veto, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 320–31 (2001) (discussing how the
evolution of budget making in England affected the Founding Fathers’ beliefs
about control of the public purse and separation of powers).
29. Compare, e.g., Dan. T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration, 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1781 n.872 (2001) (“[S]tate legislatures have re-
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standards, public policies, and competing theories of budgetary
control throughout the states.
To establish a budget, governors first submit a prospective
plan to the legislature by virtue of the executive branch’s firsthand knowledge of the revenue necessary to administer government programs.30 The legislature, however, ultimately decides both the budget’s social and policy objectives, and the extent of their funding.31 Indeed, forty-seven state constitutions
explicitly protect this legislative prerogative known as the appropriations process.32 This process is the legislature’s chief vehicle for affecting policy change,33 despite the governor’s lineitem veto, which can annul appropriations if not overridden by
a legislative supermajority.34 Once signed into law, the executive branch allots appropriations for expenditure35 and administers the budget in light of each appropriation’s purpose.36
History confirms that this system is not an arbitrary set of
legal standards, but rather a sophisticated creature, slowly advancing the interests of separation of powers over time.37 To
prevent tyrannical decisionmaking, separation of powers developed to concentrate authority in several hands through a system of checks and balances.38 This principle of governance
sponsibility for balancing state budgets . . . .”), with, e.g., David Yassky, Note,
A Two-Tiered Theory of Consolidation and Separation of Powers, 99 YALE L.J.
431, 446 (1989) (“[T]he power to order budget cuts is an executive responsibility . . . .”).
30. See TODD DONOVAN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS: INSTITUTIONS
& REFORM 313 (2010).
31. See id. at 267–69.
32. Richard D. Rosen, Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations:
The Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1,
134 –39 (1998).
33. Michael L. Buenger, Friction by Design: The Necessary Contest of
State Judicial Power and Legislative Policymaking, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 571,
606 (2009).
34. See DONOVAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 314 –15 (discussing various veto powers).
35. GOSLING, supra note 15, at 10.
36. See, e.g., State ex rel. Meyer v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 176 N.W.2d 920, 926 (Neb. 1970); State ex rel. McLeod v. McInnis, 295
S.E.2d 633, 637 (S.C. 1982) (per curiam); THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 403–04
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that “the application and disbursement of the public moneys in conformity to the general appropriations of the legislature” is an executive duty).
37. See M. Blane Michael, The Power of History to Stir a Man’s Blood, 108
W. VA. L. REV. 593, 601–02 (2006).
38. See, e.g., CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE
SPIRIT OF LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., 1989) (1748); MELVIN
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gradually evolved from societal England’s resentment of the
King’s plenary taxing and spending domain.39 In the United
States, such resentment was evident from statements by leading political and judicial figures such as James Madison40 and
Justice Joseph Story that the legislature must control the appropriations process because “otherwise, the executive would
possess an unbounded power over the public purse [and] apply
all its monied resources to his pleasure.”41 The legislature and
executive’s struggle for control of the public purse is notorious.42 This conflict compels enduring budgetary oversight by
both branches of government.
While many state judiciaries recognize that “the budget
. . . is fundamentally a legislative matter,”43 scholars continue
to acknowledge the burgeoning presence of the executive budget movement.44 This dichotomy may grow as additional state
courts view budgetary authority as a joint responsibility.45 According to the latter theory, the budget process bifurcates into
RICHTER, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF MONTESQUIEU 93 (1977); George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 277, 305–07 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1892).
39. See, e.g., Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2, § 4 (Eng.), reprinted
in ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 681, 682 (4th ed. 1886) (establishing
Parliament’s duty to detail the value and purpose of “money for or to the use of
the Crowne”); WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY
ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 232 (Burt Franklin 2d ed. 1914) (requiring the King to gather a representative body to impose taxes).
40. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 232–33
(Max Farrand ed., 1911).
41. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 222 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1994) (1833).
42. See Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, How Successfully Can the States’
Item Veto Be Transferred to the President?, 75 GEO. L.J. 159, 184 –85 (1986)
(stating that because governors more often use item vetoes to accomplish political aims than to reduce budgets, vetoes trigger numerous political battles and
legislative challenges).
43. Legislative Research Comm’n ex rel. Prather v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d
907, 925 (Ky. 1984); see also Rateree v. Rockett, 852 F.2d 946, 950–51 (7th Cir.
1988); State v. Dankworth, 672 P.2d 148, 151 n.4 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Davis v. Moon, 289 P.2d 614, 617 (Idaho 1955); Daniel Feldman, Legislating or
Litigating Public Policy Change: Gunmaker Tort Liability, 12 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 140, 158 (2004).
44. ALLEN SCHICK, BUDGET INNOVATION IN THE STATES 14 –25 (1971); Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1171, 1180–81
(1993).
45. See, e.g., Tihonovich v. Williams, 582 P.2d 1051, 1053–55 (Colo. 1978);
Bell v. Assessors of Cambridge, 28 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Mass. 1940); Campaign for
Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 58 (N.Y. 2006); State ex rel. Wis.
Senate v. Thompson, 424 N.W.2d 385, 395 (Wis. 1988).
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distinct roles: the legislature enacts law through appropriations
and the executive enforces those laws through its administrative departments.46 This view denies the reality of the modern
budgeting process. Instead, balanced-budget laws47 may actually commingle the legislative and executive budgetary obligations.
B. BALANCING THE BUDGET THROUGH DELEGATION
While the overwhelming majority of state constitutions explicitly enumerate separation of powers clauses,48 state courts
often employ the doctrine with less impetus than the controlling text.49 State legislatures are, therefore, more willing to
delegate control of appropriations levels to the executive
branch. This section explains the policy behind this nearuniversal practice and introduces the extent to which legislatures may delegate its control over appropriations.
Scholars question whether the legislature or the executive
must balance their state’s budget both prior to its establishment50 and subsequent to its enactment.51 Depending on the
specific state, it could truly be the legislature, executive, both,
or neither.52 Once the fiscal year commences, nevertheless,
most legislatures have all but surrendered any purported responsibility to the executive branch through unallotment stat-

46. See, e.g., Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 376 N.E.2d 1217, 1226
(Mass. 1978).
47. Snell, supra note 23, at 27.
48. Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1190
(1999) [hereinafter Rossi, Institutional Design].
49. Kristien G. Knapp, Resolving the Presidential Signing Statement Controversy, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 737, 768–70 (2008).
50. Compare James M. Poterba & Kim Rueben, State Fiscal Institutions
and the U.S. Municipal Bond Market, in FISCAL INSTITUTIONS AND FISCAL
PERFORMANCE 181, 191 (James M. Poterba & Jürgen von Hagen eds., 1999)
(noting that the majority of legislatures must pass balanced budgets), with
Bruce A. Wallin, Budget Processes, State, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION
& TAX POLICY, supra note 23, at 37, 38 (arguing that governors are the chief
“budget balancer[s]” because they submit balanced budgets to the legislatures).
51. Compare Yassky, supra note 29, at 446 (“[T]he power to order budget
cuts is an executive responsibility . . . .”), with Michael Abramowicz, Beyond
Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth Amendment Style, 33 TULSA L.J. 561, 609
(1997) (“[R]ewriting a budget is a quintessentially legislative task . . . .”).
52. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AFMD-93-58BR, BALANCED
BUDGET REQUIREMENTS: STATE EXPERIENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 10–23 (1993).
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utes.53 A respective governor’s authority to unallot varies
across states54 but inherent in each statute is an underlying
policy objective. One governor, rather than hundreds of often
out-of-session legislators,55 has “the greater institutional motivation and capacity for achieving fiscal restraint.”56 Despite
this fact, the confines of each state’s nondelegation doctrine
prohibit unbridled statutory delegation of legislative authority
to the executive branch.57
The doctrine, a legal cannon derived from John Locke’s The
Second Treatise of Government,58 prevents the delegation of legislative power without guiding standards.59 Each state’s judiciary has developed its own nondelegation scheme rooted in
common law.60 Evidence suggests that most state judiciaries
establish nondelegation doctrines that fall between the border
of “moderate” and “strong.”61 Specifically, twenty-three states
require a clear “legislative statement of policy” to satisfy nondelegation requirements while twenty other states demand
“specific standards in legislation.”62 A mere seven states require a “procedural safeguard.”63 In practice, state courts find
constitutional violations of the doctrine to a greater extent than
the federal judiciary.64 Though state courts have scrutinized

53. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 37.07.080(g) (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 24 -75-201.5(1)(a) (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 6529 (2010); GA.
CODE ANN. § 45-12-86 (West 2010).
54. GOSLING, supra note 15, at 167.
55. See, e.g., Snell, supra note 23, at 28 (“[S]ome legislatures meet for only
a few months every other year. Requiring legislative consent for every change
in a budget would impose delays or the costs of special sessions.”).
56. See Briffault, supra note 44, at 1180.
57. See Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1343, 1359–62 (2005) [hereinafter Rossi, Dual Constitutions].
58. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 81 (Thomas P.
Peardon ed., Liberal Arts Press 1952) (“[T]he legislative cannot transfer the
power of making laws . . . for it being but a delegated power from the people . . . .”).
59. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928) (federal doctrine); Lee v. Delmont, 36 N.W.2d 530, 538 (Minn. 1949)
(Minnesota doctrine).
60. Gary J. Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation
Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567, 578–601 (1994).
61. Rossi, Institutional Design, supra note 48, at 1193–200.
62. Id. at 1201.
63. Id. at 1191–93.
64. Id. at 1216–17.
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executive branch appropriation reductions in light of the nondelegation doctrine, their opinions often conflict.65
C. STATE-COURT SPLIT OVER EXECUTIVE BRANCH
APPROPRIATION REDUCTIONS
Depending on respective statutory language, state judiciaries have either upheld or overturned various acts of unalloting.
Unallotments without statutory authorization, commonly
known as impoundment, confront a higher magnitude of judicial scrutiny but are not per se unconstitutional. This section
aims to compartmentalize and clarify both valid and void executive branch unallotment decisions.
1. Constitutional and Valid
State courts have upheld the validity of executive branch
appropriation changes in seven distinct areas: (1) where uniform cuts or percentage caps preserved legislative policy intent,66 (2) where courts framed the delegation standard as one
to prevent insolvency,67 (3) where courts upheld unallotment on
procedural grounds,68 (4) where impoundment comported with

65. Compare, e.g., Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 265
(Fla. 1991) (holding that the legislature may not delegate power to restructure
appropriations), with, e.g., Judy v. Schaefer, 627 A.2d 1039, 1040 (Md. 1993)
(holding that the legislature may delegate power to reduce appropriations).
66. See, e.g., Folsem v. Wynn, 631 So. 2d 890, 894 –95 (Ala. 1993); Univ. of
Conn. Chapter AAUP v. Governor, 512 A.2d 152, 158–59 (Conn. 1986); La.
Ass’n of Planning & Dev. Dists. v. Treen, 435 So. 2d 1003, 1005–08 (La. Ct.
App. 1983); Schaefer, 627 A.2d at 1052; Yelle v. Bishop, 347 P.2d 1081, 1090–
91 (Wash. 1959); see also N.D. Council of Sch. Adm’rs v. Sinner, 458 N.W.2d
280, 284 –86 (N.D. 1990) (upholding an unallotment statute that allowed uniform cuts only in limited circumstances). But see State ex rel. Holmes v. State
Bd. of Fin., 367 P.2d 925, 926, 932–33 (N.M. 1961) (holding unallotment unconstitutional because a percentage cap along with other exceptions did not
provide a sufficient standard).
67. See, e.g., Roselli v. Noel, 414 F. Supp. 417, 424 (D.R.I. 1976); Legislative Research Comm’n ex rel. Prather v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 926 (Ky.
1984); Bruneau v. Edwards, 517 So. 2d 818, 826 (La. Ct. App. 1987); New Eng.
Div. of Am. Cancer Soc’y v. Comm’r of Admin., 769 N.E.2d 1248, 1257 (Mass.
2002); Rukavina v. Pawlenty, 684 N.W.2d 525, 535 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); Bd.
of Educ. v. Gilligan, 301 N.E.2d 911, 914 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973), aff’d on other
grounds, 311 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 1974); Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 109
S.E.2d 552, 559–60 (W. Va. 1959); see also Perth Amboy Bd. of Educ. v. Christie, 997 A.2d 262, 268–70 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (per curiam) (requiring unallotments to conform to legislative intent).
68. See, e.g., Gilligan, 301 N.E.2d at 915.
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legislative intent,69 (5) where unallotment statutes required
further legislative approval,70 (6) where courts upheld unallotments without adjudicating the merits of the constitutional
question,71 and (7) where the executive branch transferred appropriations within a department.72 The following paragraphs
briefly discuss the former three methods in turn, as they best
represent so-called emergency unallotments.
Of the several jurisdictions upholding uniform or percentage-capped reductions, the court in University of Connecticut
Chapter AAUP v. Governor73 advanced the clearest illustration
of statutory compliance with the nondelegation doctrine. The
court affirmed that unallotment statutes are constitutional
where the text provides a temporal limit on when the executive
may unallot, and provides a percentage limit on the extent to
which the executive may do so.74
Courts upholding the delegation of appropriation reductions have often done so on divergent grounds. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, for instance, framed the nondelegation standard as one where the legislature delegates the
capacity to prevent insolvency, rather than the power to override legislative policy priorities.75 A Louisiana appellate court,
in contrast, enunciated its own standard, proclaiming that “[n]o
restrictions, standards, or guidelines are required” for executive unalloting as long as it is to “avoid a deficit.”76

69. See, e.g., Rios v. Symington, 833 P.2d 20, 29 (Ariz. 1992) (holding impoundment as constitutional when “the legislative purpose of the appropriation is carried out and funds remain”); Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 376
N.E.2d 1217, 1222 (Mass. 1978) (“[A] refusal to expend funds for the purpose
of amending or defeating legislative objectives is to be distinguished from the
exercise of executive judgment that the full legislative objectives can be accomplished by a lesser expenditure of funds than appropriated.”).
70. See, e.g., Prather, 664 S.W.2d at 924; Hunter v. State, 865 A.2d 381,
387, 392–96 (Vt. 2004).
71. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Waihee, 768 P.2d 1279, 1288 (Haw. 1989); see
also Mich. Ass’n of Cntys. v. Dep’t of Mgmt. & Budget, 345 N.W.2d 584, 591–92
(Mich. 1984) (citing MICH. CONST. art. V, § 20); Cnty. of Cabarrus v. Tolson, 610
S.E.2d 443, 445–46 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (citing N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(3)).
72. See, e.g., Bussie v. McKeithen, 259 So. 2d 345, 351–52 (La. Ct. App.
1971); Advisory Op. in re Separation of Powers, 295 S.E.2d 589, 593–94 (N.C.
1982).
73. 512 A.2d 152 (Conn. 1986).
74. See id. at 159.
75. See New Eng. Div. of Am. Cancer Soc’y v. Comm’r of Admin., 769
N.E.2d 1248, 1257 (Mass. 2002).
76. Bruneau v. Edwards, 517 So. 2d 818, 826 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
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Although the preceding ensemble of cases upheld the facial
constitutionality of unallotment statutes, a few courts have adjudicated their procedural scope. In Board of Education v. Gilligan, an Ohio appellate court upheld former Governor John
Gilligan’s application of Ohio’s unallotment statute.77 At the
time Governor Gilligan instituted the unallotments, the legislature had yet to enact an appropriations bill or a final budget.78
In defending the governor’s actions, the court dismissed the
implicit requirement that the state must first enact a budget to
unallot.79 While a number of courts have considered and confirmed the constitutionality of executive branch appropriation
reductions, albeit on conflicting grounds, a commensurate
number of courts have held otherwise.
2. Unconstitutional and Void
State courts have overturned executive changes of appropriations in four particular circumstances: (1) where discretionary unallotments usurped legislative policy intent,80 (2) where
the executive impounded appropriations,81 (3) where the executive failed to follow proper statutory procedures,82 and (4)
where the executive transferred appropriations across depart-

77. See Bd. of Educ. v. Gilligan, 301 N.E.2d 911, 915 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973),
aff’d on other grounds, 311 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 1974).
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. See, e.g., State v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140, 1142–43
(Alaska 1987) (per curiam); Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d
260, 264 –65 (Fla. 1991); Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 369–70 (Minn.
2010) (Page, J., concurring); State Emps. Ass’n, Inc. v. Daines, 824 P.2d 276,
279–80 (Nev. 1992) (per curiam); Commcn’s Workers v. Florio, 617 A.2d 223,
234 (N.J. 1992) (“The Legislature properly has the power to reduce appropriations for the operate of State government.”); State ex rel. Schwartz v. Johnson,
907 P.2d 1001, 1008 (N.M. 1995); State ex rel. Hudson v. Carter, 27 P.2d 617,
626 (Okla. 1933) (“The legislature is without authority of law to confer upon
the governor the power to reduce . . . appropriation[s].”); see also Winter v.
Barrett, 186 N.E. 113, 127 (Ill. 1933) (per curiam) (holding that the legislature
determines the “objects and purposes” for appropriations and shall not delegate this discretionary power).
81. See, e.g., W. Side Org. Health Servs. Corp. v. Thompson, 391 N.E.2d
392, 402 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979), rev’d on grounds of mootness, 404 N.E.2d 208 (Ill.
1980); Cnty. of Oneida v. Berle, 404 N.E.2d 133, 137 (N.Y. 1980) (per curiam);
In re Advisory Op. to the House of Representatives, 576 A.2d 1371, 1373–74
(R.I. 1990).
82. See, e.g., Etherton v. Wyatt, 293 N.E.2d 43, 50–51 (Ind. Ct. App.
1973); Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 368; Gilstrap v. S.C. Budget & Control Bd., 423
S.E.2d 101, 105 (S.C. 1992) (per curiam).
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mental budgets.83 The following paragraphs briefly discuss the
former three because they represent emergency unallotments
within this context.
A trio of state cases has offered corresponding justifications
against an executive’s discretion to abate appropriations.84 The
Florida Supreme Court held that constitutional unalloting
could only exist where “legislative intent [to delegate the power
to reduce appropriations] is clearly established and can be directly followed.”85 Taking the analysis one step further, the
court in State v. Fairbanks North Star Borough concluded that
unabridged unallotments constituted nothing more than a
second veto power that the legislature could not override.86 The
clearest articulation of these holdings, expressed by the New
Mexico Supreme Court, is that the legislature cannot delegate
“its policy-making responsibility”87 and allow the “discretionary
fiscal policy” of the governor to take its place.88 Courts have
overturned gubernatorial impoundments on parallel grounds.
In County of Oneida v. Berle, former New York Governor
Hugh Carey impounded appropriations to ensure that the
state’s budget had a positive balance shortly after the fiscal
year commenced.89 The court found the act unconstitutional because Governor Carey had a duty to “faithfully execute” the appropriations he signed into law.90 The decision added to the notion that governors may not inject their fiscal policy objectives
into enacted appropriations.91 Instead, governors must first
make a good faith effort to properly expend such appropriations.92
83. See, e.g., Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508, 520–23 (Colo.
1985); Goldston v. State, 683 S.E.2d 237, 249 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009); State ex rel.
Condon v. Hodges, 562 S.E.2d 623, 630–31 (S.C. 2002).
84. See Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 736 P.2d at 1143 (noting that the statute failed to set forth “principles, intelligible or otherwise, to guide the executive”); Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 265 n.7 (Overton, J., concurring) (asserting that
the statute delegated “unlimited legislative policy-making discretion” to the
governor and cabinet); Schwartz, 907 P.2d at 1004 (finding the statute “lacked
sufficient standards” to allow the governor to decrease allotments).
85. Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 268.
86. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 736 P.2d at 1143.
87. Schwartz, 907 P.2d at 1007.
88. Id. at 1008.
89. Cnty. of Oneida v. Berle, 404 N.E.2d 133, 135–36 (N.Y. 1980)
(per curiam).
90. Id. at 137.
91. See Schwartz, 907 P.2d at 1007.
92. See Cnty. of Oneida, 404 N.E.2d at 137.
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In Brayton v. Pawlenty, Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty
signed into law appropriations in excess of his budget proposal
and vetoed tax legislation. He purportedly intended to set in
motion an unallotment scheme on the first day of the fiscal
year.93 Rather than address the constitutional question, however, the court in Brayton ruled on whether the unallotments conformed to the statute’s procedural elements.94 The court explained that unallotment is a mechanism to cure
“unanticipated deficits,”95 not a “weapon” to be used by the governor to circumvent the legislative process.96 Since a balanced
budget is a prerequisite to unallotment, the court voided Governor Pawlenty’s unallotments.97 Although Brayton is now settled law, it appears to be merely one of the first waves in a sea
of future unallotments.
D. INCREASING EXECUTIVE BRANCH APPROPRIATION
REDUCTIONS DURING THE RECESSION
As the United States languishes in the worst recession
since the Great Depression, states continue to brave the economic plight.98 Unfortunately, public revenue continues to depreciate; states expect budget deficits though 2012.99 Present
legislative action has been unsuccessful in securing long-term
balanced budgets.100 Recently, an unprecedented number of
governors have taken the unilateral action of unallotment.101 In
light of these recent events, those affected by the budget cuts
have increasingly questioned the legal validity of the unallotment process.102
93. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 359–61 (Minn. 2010).
94. See id. at 363.
95. Id. at 367.
96. Id. at 362.
97. Id. at 368.
98. See McNichol et al., supra note 18, at 3.
99. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE BUDGET UPDATE:
JULY 2010 (PRELIMINARY REPORT) 5–6, 13 (2010).
100. See id. at 5–14 (noting that deficits continue to prevail).
101. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE BUDGET
UPDATE: NOVEMBER 2009, at 16–18 (2009); Actions and Proposals to Balance
FY 2011 Budgets, supra note 19.
102. See, e.g., Ariz. Ass’n of Providers for Persons with Disabilities v. State,
219 P.3d 216, 226 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009); Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 359; In re Fiscal Year 2010 Judicial Branch Appropriations, 27 So. 3d 394, 395–96 (Miss.
2010); N.H. Health Care Ass’n v. Lynch, No. 09-E-214, 2009 WL 2364094, at
*1 (N.H. Super. Ct. June 30, 2009); Perth Amboy Bd. of Educ. v. Christie, 997
A.2d 262, 262 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (per curiam); Conn. Op. Att’y
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With a probable increase in executive branch appropriation
reductions in the future, this Note analyzes the temporal limitations and delegation standards necessary for a constitutional
unallotment law. In so doing, Part II builds upon Brayton in
order to dissect the legal and policy implications of aggressive
executive unallotments.
II. UNALLOTMENT’S TEMPORAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS
This Part expands upon Brayton to construct a foundation
for examining both the procedural and substantive scope of unalloting. For three primary reasons, Brayton is a more appropriate vehicle to clarify the dissatisfaction with unallotment
than a superficial national survey. First, the case was unique
because it called into question both the procedural and substantive limits of unallotment.103 Second, Minnesota’s nondelegation doctrine parallels a significant number of its peers.104
Third, Minnesota’s unallotment statute exhibits the two flaws
found in many statutes—failure to discernibly articulate temporal limitations105 and delegation of discretionary power to reduce appropriations.106 In the sphere of unallotment, the broad
legal and policy issues seen in Brayton transcend state lines.
The first section revisits Brayton in order to define the
temporal limitations and procedural scope of unallotment. The
Gen. No. 2009-011, 2009 WL 3406965, at *1 (Oct. 20, 2009); Kan. Op. Att’y
Gen. No. 2009-16, 2009 WL 2356270, at *1 (July 29, 2009).
103. See Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 359–63.
104. See Rossi, Institutional Design, supra note 48, at 1191–201, 1223
(stating that most states require “at a minimum, some legislative statement of
policy”).
105. Compare MINN. STAT. § 16A.152 subdiv. 4(a) (2008) (“If the commissioner determines that probable receipts for the general fund will be less than
anticipated . . . .”), with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:75(C) (2009) (“Upon receiving notification that a projected deficit exists . . . .”), and TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 317.002 (West 2009) (“After finding that an emergency exists . . . .”).
106. See GOSLING, supra note 15, at 10 (asserting that most legislatures
“delegate some of their authority [over the budget] to the executive branch”).
Compare MINN. STAT. § 16A.152 subdiv. 4(b) (2008) (“An additional deficit
shall, with the approval of the governor . . . be made up by reducing unexpended allotments . . . .”), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27B-26 (West 2010)
(“[T]he commissioner, on order of the governor, shall have the power to revise
the quarterly allotments.”), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 126.05 (West 2010)
(“[T]he governor may declare a fiscal emergency and may issue such orders as
necessary . . . to reduce expenditures . . . .”), and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11B-2-21
(LexisNexis 2005) (“[The governor] may instruct the secretary to reduce all
appropriations out of general revenue . . . as necessary . . . .”).
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second section analyzes and settles the dispute over the proper
nondelegation standard for unallotments. The final section
scrutinizes Governor Pawlenty’s expansive utilization of Minnesota’s unallotment statute. The following three sections are
not merely an analysis of unalloting in Minnesota but a foundation for highlighting the respective procedural, constitutional, and public-policy shortcomings representative in discretionary executive branch appropriation reductions.
A. DEFINING UNALLOTMENT’S TEMPORAL LIMITATIONS
Unallotment challenges often entail the delegation of legislative authority. The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, recently engaged in a statutory-interpretation analysis to elucidate the ambiguous time frame in which a governor can
unallot.107 This section builds upon Brayton and juxtaposes the
court’s holding with prior executive branch appropriation reduction cases that both refute and corroborate the decision.
1. Brayton Revisited
The central issue in Brayton was the disputed nature of
the statute’s temporal language: that the executive branch
must determine that “probable receipts for the general fund
will be less than anticipated, and that the amount available for
the remainder of the biennium will be less than needed” before
unalloting.108 The governor proposed that this language authorized unalloting at any moment in time, even before the biennium commenced.109 The plaintiffs challenged the governor’s
assertion, contending that the statute only applied to unanticipated budget crises.110 After grappling with the parties’ dissension, the court found the statute ambiguous for failing to make
clear exactly when the governor should first anticipate receipts
and for failing to define the purpose for which the government
needs the revenue.111 To resolve the ambiguity, the court concluded that the drafters’ intent was not to facilitate a prospective budget-balancing mechanism, but rather to create a meth107. See Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 362–68.
108. Id. at 360 (citing § 16A.152 subdiv. 4(a)).
109. Id. at 362; see also Peter Nelson, In Oral Arguments, Justice Gildea
Hinted at Another Interpretation of the Unallotment Statute, CENTER AM.
EXPERIMENT (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.americanexperiment.org/publications/
2010/20100326nelson.php (arguing that unallotment is permissible any time a
projected budget deficit exists).
110. Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 363.
111. See id. at 363–64.
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od to “address unanticipated deficits” arising subsequent to the
enactment of a budget.112 In other words, the governor’s premature unallotments evaded the “constitutionally prescribed
[budget] process.”113 The court further clarified the statute by
announcing that the value of anticipated receipts “appeared to
be adequate to fund” the appropriations in the enacted budget.114 The result was that the unallotments were void, in part
due to the governor’s tax increase veto that prevented the
enactment of a balanced budget.115 But what if the budget was
balanced?
2. Parsing Through Further Textual Ambiguities
The Minnesota Supreme Court made an ambitious effort to
define the pivotal unallotment phrases “less than anticipated”
and “remainder of the biennium.”116 Where a balanced budget
exists, the court’s opinion does little to prevent unalloting at
the very beginning of a biennium, however. The time frame to
unallot principally arises upon the executive’s expectation that
projected revenues will be, at some point in the future, less
than anticipated.117 Essentially, governors can sign appropriations into law and unallot upon the belief that a future recession will put the state’s budget into deficiency.
This textual ambiguity exists in the seemingly harmless
word “will,” which frustrates the policy behind unallotment.118
For example, governors need not establish that revenue has already become less than anticipated. Instead, they must establish only that revenue will be less than anticipated in future

112. Id. at 366–67.
113. Id. at 367.
114. Id. at 368.
115. See id. at 361, 368; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 109
S.E.2d 552, 562 (W. Va. 1959) (suggesting that unallotment would be improper
where the state enacts an unbalanced budget).
116. See Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 363–64, 368.
117. MINN. STAT. § 16A.152 subdiv. 4(a) (2008); see, e.g., MO. REV. STAT.
§ 33.290 (West 2001); N.H. STAT. ANN. § 9:16-b (LexisNexis 2008); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 126:05 (West 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 16.50(7) (West 2009). But
see State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Rockefeller, 281 S.E.2d 131, 135 (W. Va. 1981)
(holding that the executive has the burden of persuasion in proving that a
probable budget deficiency necessitates unalloting).
118. See Bardsley v. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 870 P.2d 641, 646 (Colo.
App. 1994) (noting that the purpose of unallotment is to “allow the governor to
act on the basis of immediacy”).
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months or perhaps years.119 It remains uncertain if a governor
would employ this expansive, but plausible, interpretation. It
would be an arresting act of power, but perhaps not much
greater than that seen in Minnesota. Because state judiciaries
construe the plain meaning of statutes,120 this interpretation
may persist. In at least three states with the same statutory
language as Minnesota—Arkansas, Hawaii, and Indiana121—
legal challenges have been less than helpful in explicating
these concerns.122 Furthermore, precedent from other jurisdictions calls Brayton’s progeny into question.
3. Juxtaposing Brayton with Precedent
In Brayton, the court rightfully hesitated to rely on
precedent from outside Minnesota.123 The following two cases
provide factual circumstances similar to Brayton but arrive at
inconsistent rulings. Of the utmost importance in discussing
these cases is acknowledging the courts’ divergent treatment of
unallotments by governors.
In Gilligan, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that whatever
unallotment’s purpose, governors could reduce appropriations
even before the legislature enacts them into law.124 The statute
authorized unalloting upon the governor’s determination that
revenue “will in all probability be less than the appropriations
for” the fiscal year.125 Gilligan’s acceptance of gubernatorial
appropriation reductions in the absence of an enacted budget
appears to support the procedural validity of Governor Pawlen-

119. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1668 (2002); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 29, § 9B (LexisNexis 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.1391 (West
2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-104 -13(1) (2009).
120. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 22, at 763–64.
121. Compare § 16A.152 subdiv. 4(a) (stating that “probable receipts
. . . will be less than anticipated” and the “amount available for the remainder
of the biennium will be less than needed”), HAW. REV. STAT. § 37-37(a) (2009)
(same), and IND. CODE ANN. § 4 -13-2-18(f ) (LexisNexis 2010) (same), with
ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-4 -608(4) (2010) (stating that “estimated revenues
. . . will be less than was anticipated” and “the funds available for the remainder of the fiscal year will be less than the amount estimated”).
122. See Mottl v. Miyahira, 23 P.3d 716 (Haw. 2001); Bd. of Educ. v. Waihee, 768 P.2d 1279 (Haw. 1989); Etherton v. Wyatt, 293 N.E.2d 43 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1973).
123. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 367 n.5 (Minn. 2010).
124. See Bd. of Educ. v. Gilligan, 301 N.E.2d 911, 913 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973),
aff’d on other grounds, 311 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 1974).
125. Id. at 914 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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ty’s comparable unallotments. Such an unforeseen application
of the statute,126 however, demands statutory revision.
Alternatively, the New York Court of Appeals in County of
Oneida held that former Governor Hugh Carey violated his
constitutional duty to “take care that [the laws be] faithfully
executed” when he impounded appropriations directly after
signing them into law.127 Much like Governor Pawlenty, Governor Carey signed into law specific appropriations exceeding
those in his budget proposal rather than exercising his lineitem veto.128 The governor, shortly after the fiscal year commenced, impounded those exact appropriations to ensure the
state budget had a positive balance.129 If the Minnesota Supreme Court adhered to the same line of reasoning, Governor
Pawlenty’s application of the unallotment statute would have
violated the state constitution.130
It is well documented that judiciaries defer to executive interpretations of ambiguous statutes, at least in federal court.131
Extensive deference, however, is counterintuitive within a doctrinal scheme that purports to require guiding standards for
administrative action.132 One author has recognized that statutes that delegate emergency decisionmaking authority not only engender ambiguous interpretations respecting their temporal and discretionary limitations, but also face further
questions of constitutionality.133 Appropriately, the next section
confirms that the nondelegation doctrine prohibits unbridled
executive discretion during the unallotment process.

126. Id. at 915 (acknowledging that the legislature likely did not intend to
allow the governor to make “selective and discriminatory cuts in state programs
to force the legislature into concurrence with the fiscal policies of the executive”).
127. Cnty. Of Oneida v. Berle, 404 N.E.2d 133, 137 (N.Y. 1980) (per curiam) (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 3).
128. See id. at 133–35.
129. Id. at 135–36.
130. See MINN. CONST. art. V, § 3 (noting that the governor “shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed”).
131. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842–44 (1984).
132. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315,
330–31 (2000) (“Executive interpretation of a vague statute is not enough
when the purpose of the [nondelegation doctrine] . . . is to require Congress to
make its instructions clear.”).
133. See Rossi, Lawmaking in Crisis, supra note 20, at 274.

2011]

THE CLOYING USE OF UNALLOTMENT

1089

B. ESTABLISHING THE NONDELEGATION STANDARD
State legislatures, in accordance with their respective constitutions, determine how, when, and for what purposes the executive branch shall apply public funds for government administration.134 The critical unallotment question remains the
extent to which a legislature may delegate this power, if at all.
In order to formulate unallotment’s proper nondelegation
standard, one must resolve three debated issues: which branch
is obligated to balance the budget, what power an unallotment
statute delegates to the executive, and the extent to which a
legislature may delegate the appropriations power. This section
attempts to answer these questions.
The first inquiry is whether constitutions entrust the legislature or the executive branch with budget-balancing responsibility. Legislatures must enact a balanced budget in thirtyseven states.135 Thus, many states hold the legislature accountable for equating receipts and expenditures.136 Yet in so doing
states ignore the oscillation of anticipated receipts, which often
fall below baseline, thereby affirming the inconsequentiality of
the legislature’s budget implementation by fiscal period’s end.
Irrespective of this legislative action, the majority of state constitutions mandate a balanced budget at the close of the fiscal
period.137 Budget balancing, therefore, demands continued enforcement.138 Since governors retain the spending power, it is a
gubernatorial responsibility to ensure a balanced budget exists
while taking into consideration prior legislative appropriations.139 This is not to suggest, however, that legislatures cannot reduce appropriations to place the state’s budget into equi-

134. JEFFREY M. ELLIOT, THE STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLITICAL
DICTIONARY 93 (1988).
135. Poterba & Rueben, supra note 50, at 191.
136. See Coenen, supra note 29, at 1781 n.872.
137. One report argues that although few constitutions explicitly require a
year-end balance, thirty-nine states interpret their constitutions as such. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 52, at 16–17.
138. See Norman R. Williams, Executive Review in the Fragmented Executive: State Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 565,
639 (2006) (confirming that all governors must faithfully execute the laws of
their state).
139. Cf. Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1382
(1988) (explaining that in the federal government, “the underlying substantive
legislation creating the entitlement or authorizing the executive branch to incur the obligation . . . constitutes the ultimate source of spending authority”).
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librium,140 but simply that the legal responsibility lies with the
governor, especially when the legislature has adjourned. This
executive authority cannot be plenary, and may actually require legislative authorization, because executive budget cuts
infringe upon the legislature’s constitutional power of appropriations.
Answering the second inquiry is a more arduous task. The
question is whether unallotment is a delegation of emergency
budget balancing or of reducing appropriations. State judiciaries have lacked harmonization in their answers.141 The gravamen of unallotment statutes is that they assist governors in
balancing budgets during emergencies,142 but its effect is unmistakably one of altering appropriations. The idea that state
constitutions endow the executive branch with budgetbalancing accountability implies that the legislature cannot
delegate the very same thing. Unallotment statutes, therefore,
necessarily prescribe the manner in which the executive branch
is to balance the budget. Thus, the power to reduce appropriations is a delegated means to achieve this end, and not vice versa.
Several constitutional law professors recently insinuated
that budget balancing is, in fact, a gubernatorial responsibility.
Accordingly, scrutinizing unallotment statutes as a legislative
encroachment of executive power is unavoidable.143 The professors erroneously rely on an influential Supreme Court case,
Bowsher v. Synar,144 and argue that the discretion to reduce
appropriations is an executive power.145 If correct, unallotment
140. Vermont’s unallotment statute addresses this argument. See VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 704(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009).
141. Compare, e.g., State v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140,
1142–43 (Alaska 1987) (per curiam), with, e.g., New Eng. Div. of Am. Cancer
Soc’y v. Comm’r of Admin., 769 N.E.2d 1248, 1257 (Mass. 2002).
142. See, e.g., Bardsley v. Colo. Dep’t. of Pub. Safety, 870 P.2d 641, 646
(Colo. App. 1994); Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 367 (Minn. 2010).
143. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Professors of Constitutional Law and Separation of Powers at 5, 7, Brayton, 781 N.W.2d 357 (No. A10-64) [hereinafter
Brief of Professors of Constitutional Law] (arguing that legislative oversight of
executive expenditures “risks unconstitutionally intruding on the powers of
the executive branch”). But see Legislative Research Comm’n ex rel. Prather v.
Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 926 (Ky. 1984) (holding that unallotment statutes do
not constitute “administration of the budget,” but are simply laws that the executive must enforce).
144. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
145. Brief of Professors of Constitutional Law, supra note 143, at 8–11.
Contra Abbey v. Rowland, 359 F. Supp. 2d 94, 99–100 (D. Conn. 2005) (holding
that a governor’s discretionary budget cuts are a legislative function). The is-
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statutes are unconstitutional because they encroach upon the
executive’s budget-balancing domain.146 Therefore, unalloting
would be invalid if executed under the statute.147 More persuasive are the professors’ acknowledgments of the statute’s limiting specifications: setting forth temporal standards, suggesting
initial sources of unalloting, requiring legislative consultation,
and arguing that the legislature may override unallotments.148
But ambiguous temporal limitations, permissive suggestions,
mere legislative consultation, and the legislature’s capacity to
override unallotments months after the reductions do nothing
to restrain executive discretion. Governor Pawlenty’s unallotments are more than enough to prove this.149
As previously argued, budget balancing is an exercise of
the executive branch’s spending authority; nevertheless, it cannot be exclusive or it would permit the governor’s partial usurpation of the appropriations power.150 Accordingly, the third
inquiry ponders the degree to which the legislature can delegate control over appropriations. Legislatures can never delegate their exclusive appropriations power because it is a constitutionally derived source of lawmaking.151 In circumstances
concerning unallotment, the legislature already set the maximum appropriations level to ensure that legislative intent is
fulfilled.152 It naturally follows that the legislature must promsue in Bowsher was whether Congress could both write and execute a budget
reduction statute. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733–34. State legislatures, on the
other hand, do not write and execute unallotment statutes.
146. Henry L. Chambers, Jr. & Dennis E. Logue, Jr., Separation of Powers
and the 1995-1996 Budget Impasse, 16 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 51, 82 (1996)
(“If making budget cuts is an exercise of executive power, passing legislation regarding budget cuts could be deemed as violative of separation of powers . . . .”).
147. Id.
148. Brief for Professors of Constitutional Law, supra note 143, at 15–18;
see also Rossi, Lawmaking in Crisis, supra note 20, at 264 (“[A] presumption of
state executive lawmaking recognizes that spending decisions during a crisis
may be made by the executive, subject to legislative ratification or override.”
(emphasis added)).
149. See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae for Minnesota House of Representatives, Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 2010) (No. A10-64)
(indicating the legislature’s disapproval of the governor’s unallotments).
150. See State ex rel. Schwartz v. Johnson, 907 P.2d 1001, 1006 (N.M.
1995) (holding that the “power to reduce appropriations . . . is a legislative
function” (quoting Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 265
(Fla. 1991))).
151. See Rosen, supra note 32, at 134 –39.
152. See, e.g., Rios v. Symington, 833 P.2d 20, 29 (Ariz. 1992); Colo. Gen.
Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508, 520, 522 (Colo. 1985); Op. of the Justices to
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ulgate guiding unallotment standards so that the executive
does not contravene its intent.153
State judiciaries revere the nondelegation doctrine much
more than federal courts.154 Indeed, several justifications exist
for enhancing an unallotment nondelegation standard. While
the doctrine’s central tenet is to “limit executive discretion,”155
many unallotment laws have failed to reflect this maxim.156
The limited institutional capacity of state legislatures, as compared to that of Congress, necessitates a stronger judicial review of delegated duties.157 Accordingly, when a legislative delegation involves the purse strings, state judiciaries must be
much more cognizant of a separation of powers violation.158
Due to the legislature’s failure to preserve the scope and purpose of its appropriations, Minnesota’s unallotment statute159
and those similarly situated160 are unconstitutional. The followthe Senate, 376 N.E.2d 1217, 1223 (Mass. 1978); Island Cnty. Comm. on Assessment Ratios v. Dep’t of Revenue, 500 P.2d 756, 763 (Wash. 1972).
153. See, e.g., Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 44 (1975) (prohibiting
presidential impoundment); Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Detroit, 537
N.W.2d 436, 440 (Mich. 1995) (prohibiting mayoral impoundment); Cnty. of
Oneida v. Berle, 404 N.E.2d 133, 137 (N.Y. 1980) (per curiam) (prohibiting gubernatorial impoundment); Thomas P. Lauth & Paula E. Steinbauer, Budgeting in State Government: Control and Management, in HANDBOOK OF STATE
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION 155, 166–67 (John J. Gargan ed., 2000)
(“Budget offices can also limit the amount of revenue allotments to agencies”
but should “adher[e] . . . to legislative intent as expressed in the appropriations act . . . .”).
154. Rossi, Dual Constitutions, supra note 57, at 1359.
155. Sunstein, supra note 132, at 318.
156. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24 -2-102(4) (West 2010); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 29, §§ 9B–9C (West 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 353.225 (LexisNexis 2009).
157. See James E. Westbrook, The Use of the Nondelegation Doctrine in
Public Sector Labor Law, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 331, 363 (1986).
158. See Woodrow E. Turner, Note, The New Post 9/11 America or the
Making of King George: A Review of Executive Power in the Effort to Combat
Global Terrorism as It Relates to the Power of the Purse, 106 W. VA. L. REV.
445, 479 (2004) (arguing for a stronger nondelegation doctrine to prohibit the
legislature from delegating the power of the purse); cf. Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 711 (1994) (reviewing
DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)) (“[I]ndividual
jurists at times joined the chorus of those condemning delegation of policymaking authority . . . .”).
159. MINN. STAT. § 16A.152 subdiv. 4(b) (2008) (“Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the commissioner is empowered to defer or suspend
prior statutorily created obligations . . . .”).
160. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3722 (2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11B2-21 (West 2010).
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ing section bridges the gap between the nondelegation doctrine
and unallotment’s policy shortcomings.
C. DISCRETIONARY UNALLOTING JEOPARDIZES DEMOCRACY
If legal underpinnings were not reason enough for unallotment reform, then policy justifications surely suffice. The act
of unalloting does, in fact, authorize gubernatorial lawmaking.
This section discusses this problematic policy ramification implicit in executive branch appropriation reductions.
The quintessential illustration of unallotment’s ultimate
shortcoming is the executive’s unchecked authority to unilaterally change substantive law vis-à-vis the modification of statutory language.161 In Minnesota, this arrogation of power included the governor’s complete elimination of a special diet
program,162 reduction of a property tax rebate program,163 and
reduction of hours for which personal care attendants could receive monthly public payments.164 The state legislature, of
course, created each of these programs by law. The latter two
instances confirm unallotment’s expanding role in Minnesota.
Governor Pawlenty, in his budget proposal, requested that the
legislature decrease the statutory value of “rent attributable to
property taxes”—a formulaic value used to refund renters
whose rents are high relative to their incomes—from nineteen
to fifteen percent.165 After consideration, the legislature passed
on the recommendation.166 Nonetheless, when the legislative
session ended, the governor used unallotment to redraft the
statutory language from nineteen to fifteen percent.167 During
the same session, the legislature redrafted the language of a
statute that capped public payments to personal care assistants

161. Compare, e.g., Baker v. Fletcher, 204 S.W.3d 589, 593 (Ky. 2006) (invalidating unallotment), with, e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. v.
Olson, 338 N.W.2d 97, 103 (N.D. 1983) (upholding unallotment).
162. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 358–59 (Minn. 2010).
163. See MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET DEP’T, supra note 9, at 2.
164. See id. at 4.
165. See Tax Policy, Aids and Credits, ST. MINN., 18 (Jan. 27, 2009), http://
www.mmb.state.mn.us/doc/budget/narratives/gov09/tax-policy.pdf. This document is part of a larger collection of recommendations from the governor. See
MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET DEP’T, AGENCY LEVEL NARRATIVES INCLUDING
GOVERNOR’S RECOMMENDATIONS FISCAL DATA 1/27/2009 (2009), available at
http://www.doer.state.mn.us/gov-bud-10.
166. See MINN. STAT. § 290A.03 subdiv. 11 (2009) (reflecting the current
statutory rate for “[r]ent constituting property taxes” as nineteen percent).
167. See MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET DEP’T, supra note 9, at 2.
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at 310 hours of service per month.168 The governor signed the
new provision into law, only to further reduce it to 275 hours
after the legislative session ended.169 Before the decision in
Brayton, which merely overturned the unallotments on procedural grounds,170 the governor eliminated at least seven legislatively established programs171 and altered the language of
multiple statutes in the areas of education, health care, and local government aid.172
With respect to similar instances of gubernatorial lawmaking, however, what appears overtly unconstitutional is not as
conclusive as it may appear.173 More important is that unalloting in this manner raises legitimacy issues with the state’s constituency.174 In one-half of a century, Minnesota governors employed the unallotment power only twice, each time unalloting
168.
169.
170.
171.

See MINN. STAT. § 256B.0659 subdiv. 11(a)(10) (2009).
See MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET DEP’T, supra note 9, at 4.
See Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363–68 (Minn. 2010).
See FISCAL ANALYSIS DEP’T, MINN. H.R., GOVERNOR’S FY 2010–11
UNALLOTMENT AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS, H. 86, 1st Sess., at 2 tbl.1
(2009), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/fiscal/files/09unallotsum
.pdf (noting the elimination of various grants and other funding programs).
172. See id. at 6–20.
173. Compare, e.g., Baker v. Fletcher, 204 S.W.3d 589, 591–93 (Ky. 2006)
(reversing the governor’s reduction of a statutorily based five percent salary
increase for state employees to 2.7 percent because the action was “‘antithetical to the [executive’s] constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed’” (quoting Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 872 (Ky.
2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted))), State of Nev. Emps.
Ass’n, Inc. v. Daines, 824 P.2d 276, 277, 279–80 (Nev. 1992) (per curiam)
(holding that the executive branch could not unallot a statutorily based four
percent wage increase to state employees because it would “essentially rewrite” the statute), and Weaver v. Evans, 495 P.2d 639, 649 (Wash. 1972)
(finding that the legislature did not intend to allow the governor to use unallotment to “modify the legislative provision of a systematic funding program,”
as doing so would “defeat the legislative purpose” of such provisions), with,
e.g., Abramson v. Hard, 155 So. 590, 597 (Ala. 1934) (stating that allotment
reductions could apply to appropriations “fixed” in statute if authorized by
law), Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. v. Olson, 338 N.W.2d 97, 100,
103 (N.D. 1983) (upholding the governor’s reduction of a statutorily based
state employee salary increase from eight percent to four percent in light of an
expected budget deficit because an appropriation is merely an authorization to
spend), and Kan. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2009-16, 2009 WL 2356270, at *2 (July
29, 2009) (acknowledging that the state’s unallotment statute “authorizes the
[executive] to suspend . . . statutory obligation[s]” because the legislature, if it
so chooses, can statutorily exempt programs from unallotment).
174. See Duxbury v. Donovan, 138 N.W.2d 692, 696 (Minn. 1965) (“[T]he
necessary public acceptance of a law is assured more definitely when legislation opposed by the chief executive has been confirmed by a two-thirds vote of
both houses.”).
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across-the-board.175 What was once a device to safeguard financial stability has become cloying. Since 2003, Governor Pawlenty has unalloted on three separate occasions,176 quickly turning
the statute into a political tool to abandon appropriations,177
redraft statutory language,178 and eliminate public programs.179 The principle that the governor’s “power to see that
the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be
a lawmaker”180 cannot be reconciled with unbridled, discretionary unalloting.
This discussion is not merely an attempt to analyze unalloting in Minnesota, but rather an effort to demonstrate the
manner in which a governor can transcend the lines of separation of powers through unallotment. Whether it is a matter of
law or a change in policy, legislatures must begin reform efforts
so that the executive branch once again exercises unallotment
not as a political tool, but as a financial safeguard.
III. MODEL STATUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT
In light of the foregoing analysis, this Part develops a model unallotment statute, which states can implement or reference while reforming their current law or while proposing new
legislation.181 In so doing, the model statute synergizes the

175. See Minn. Fed’n of Teachers v. Quie, No. 447358, slip op. at 2–3
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 27, 1981) (describing Governor Albert Quie’s 1980 unallotment); ROYCE HANSON, TRIBUNE OF THE PEOPLE: THE MINNESOTA
LEGISLATURE AND ITS LEADERSHIP 183 (1989) (describing Governor Rudy Perpich’s 1985 unallotment).
176. See Peter S. Wattson, Legislative History of Unallotment Power, MINN.
SENATE, 11–13 (June 29, 2009), http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/
scr/treatise/unallotment/Unallotment.pdf.
177. See Levinson, supra note 13 (discussing Governor Pawlenty’s attempts
to “slash spending on all sorts of public services”).
178. See MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET DEP’T, supra note 9, at 2.
179. See Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Minn. 2010) (discussing the elimination of payments to one public program).
180. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
While the expanding role of the administrative state and its related rulemaking and adjudicatory functions are well known, these lawmaking powers are
not comparable to amending legislatively created laws through unallotment.
181. At least one New York organization is already calling for that state to
adopt an unallotment statute. See Robert B. Ward, Gubernatorial Powers to
Address Budget Gaps During the Fiscal Year, NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST.
GOV’T, 20–22 (June 17, 2010), http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/budgetary_balance_
ny/2010-06-17-Gubernatorial_Powers.pdf.
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foremost elements of existing laws.182 The first section addresses the necessity of immediate legislative action.183 The
second section then details the model statute and the variables
reform-minded legislators must observe. The third section analyzes the model statute. This Part concludes by proposing alternative avenues to reform.
A. MODEL STATUTE AS A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM
In 1972, a disingenuous act of presidential power184 forced
Congress to constrain the executive branch’s power to rescind
appropriations under what one may consider the federal unallotment statute.185 Considering the disquieting incidents in
Brayton,186 now is the most suitable time for legislatures to
contemplate reform. The legislative process first afforded the
executive branch the capacity to prevent budget deficiencies,187
so it is only appropriate that legislatures invoke the same
process to curb executive discretion.
The practicality of adopting the following model statute is
favorable because it protects legislative power. The judicial system, as it has proven, is an ineffective vehicle for reform because of the uncertainty of litigation,188 the justiciability concerns surrounding unallotment,189 the binding nature of
182. The author uses unallotment, allotment reduction, and appropriate
reduction interchangeably. Statutory text, however, must be consistent when
referring to either allotment reductions or appropriation reductions.
183. See, e.g., Joanna M. Myers, Note, When the Governor Legislates: PostEnactment Budget Changes and the Separation of Powers in Nevada, 10 NEV.
L.J. 229, 231–35 (2009) (discussing the recent fiscal crisis precipitating similar
unallotment issues in Nevada).
184. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 40 (1975) (detailing President Nixon’s impoundments).
185. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-344, §§ 1011–1017, 88 Stat. 297, 333–39 (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. §§ 682–688 (2006)) (requiring, inter alia, congressional approval of
presidential budget reductions).
186. 781 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Minn. 2010).
187. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 37.07.080(g) (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,
§ 6529 (Michie Supp. 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-104 -13(1) (West Supp. 2009).
188. Cf. Michael E. Libonati, The Legislative Branch, in 3 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 37, 40 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) (noting that state courts’ nondelegation doctrine
jurisprudence is “unpredictable and inconsistent”).
189. See, e.g., Mottl v. Miyahira, 23 P.3d 716, 730 (Haw. 2001) (dismissing
for lack of standing a university faculty members’ suit against the governor
over unallotment); W. Side Org. Health Servs. Corp. v. Thompson, 404 N.E.2d
208, 211 (Ill. 1980) (dismissing for mootness a health organization’s suit
against the governor over impoundment); State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Caper-
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precedent,190 and the judicial system’s preference to have legislatures overturn precedent.191 Even if those courts that uphold
the constitutionality of discretionary unalloting are correct, legislation is proper as a means of changing policy or closing loopholes.
A governor’s veto power and the shrewd political choices of
legislators may act as the only barriers to the model statute’s
adoption. A veto, of course, remains subject to a legislative
override,192 which may be likely considering some legislators’
dissatisfaction with gubernatorial appropriation reductions.193
As a method of garnering political capital, on the other hand,
some legislators may value discretionary unalloting as a mechanism to both eschew difficult, unpopular budget cuts and to
blame the executive branch for any consequential public backlash.
Nevertheless, effective reform must account for three variables. First, reform must preserve legislative policy initiatives
established in appropriations. Second, the model statute must
enforce retroactive unalloting with a clearly articulated time
frame, rather than encouraging premature, prospective budget
reductions. Finally, the model statute must safeguard the executive’s authority to protect solvency when the legislature
lacks a similar capacity to act.194 The following model statute
aims to incorporate these three variables.
B. MODEL UNALLOTMENT STATUTE
(1)195 The Legislature recognizes that acts of appropriations and their sources of funding reflect the priorities for exton, 441 S.E.2d 373, 376 (W. Va. 1994) (dismissing for mootness a teachers’
suit against the governor over unallotment).
190. See Yair Listoken, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J.
480, 538 (2008) (discussing the judiciary’s reluctance to overturn precedent
even if it would institute a positive policy change).
191. Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 899, 939 (2009).
192. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 44, at 1181 (“Legislatures are more inclined to challenge gubernatorial budgetary priorities . . . in state budgets.”).
193. For example, the plaintiff in the Minnesota unallotment case, Rukavina v. Pawlenty, was a state legislator. 684 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2004).
194. See Snell, supra note 23, at 28 (noting the limitations on a legislature’s power to effectively address budgetary concerns).
195. This section borrows heavily from the language of title 32, section
704(a) of the Vermont Statutes. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 704(a) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2009).
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penditures of public funds enacted by the Legislature and that
major reductions or adjustments, when required by reduced
state revenues, ought to be made whenever possible by an act
of the Legislature reflecting its revisions of those priorities.
Nevertheless, authorized appropriations and their sources of
funding may be adjusted pursuant to the provisions of this section.
(2) If following the proper enactment of the fiscal year’s
budget,196 the Governor first discovers that estimated fiscalyear-end revenues are not sufficient to meet the expenditures
authorized by the Legislature,197 creating a budget deficit within the current fiscal year,198 the Governor shall reduce the
budget reserve account to the extent necessary to eliminate the
budget deficit.199
(3) Should an additional deficit continue:
(a) The Governor shall reduce any appropriation in an
amount not to exceed ten percent200 as specified in subsection
(3)(b) to the extent necessary to eliminate the budget deficit. If
the Governor reduces each appropriation by ten percent and
the budget deficit continues, the Governor shall reduce any appropriations by an additional amount not to exceed five percent
of the original appropriation as specified in subsection (3)(b) to
the extent necessary to eliminate the budget deficit. If all appropriations are reduced by fifteen percent and the budget deficit continues, additional reductions shall consist of a uniform
percentage reduction of all appropriations201 to the extent necessary to eliminate the budget deficit.202
196. Cf. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 16.50(7)(a) (West 2009) (“If following the enactment of the biennial budget act . . . .”).
197. Cf. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1668 (2002) (“Whenever it appears to
the [executive] that the anticipated income and other available funds . . . will
not be sufficient to meet the expenditures authorized by the Legislature . . . .”).
198. Cf. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 35-3-8(b) (Supp. 2009) (“[Whenever state agencies are] expected to incur a deficiency within the current fiscal year . . . .”).
199. Cf. MINN. STAT. § 16A.152 subdiv. 4(a) (2008) (“[The executive shall]
reduce the amount in the budget reserve account as needed to balance expenditures with revenue.”).
200. Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4 -85(b) (West Supp. 2010) (limiting reductions by three percent of any appropriation).
201. Cf. ALA. CODE § 41-4 -90 (LexisNexis 2000) (“prorating without discrimination”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 8.31(5) (West 2008) (“uniform and prorated”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1668 (2002) (“curtail allotments equitably”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54 -44.1-12 (2008) (“uniform percentage basis”); OK.
STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 34.49(F) (West 2010) (“in the ratio”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 291.261(2)(a) (West Supp. 2010) (“by the same percentage”); S.C. CODE ANN.
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(b)203 Prior to directing agencies to reduce appropriations
as provided in subsection (3)(a), the Governor shall direct each
agency to analyze the nature of each program that receives a
general fund appropriation to determine whether the program
is mandatory or permissive and to analyze the impact of the
proposed reduction in spending on the legislative purpose of the
program. An agency shall submit its analysis to the Budget Director and shall at the same time provide a copy of the analysis
to the Legislative Fiscal Analyst. The Budget Director shall review each agency’s analysis and shall submit to the Governor
and Legislative Fiscal Analyst a copy of the Budget Director’s
recommendations for reductions in spending. The Legislative
Finance Committee shall meet within fifteen days of the date
that the proposed changes to the recommendations for reductions in spending are provided to the Legislative Fiscal Analyst.
The Legislative Fiscal Analyst shall provide a copy of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst’s review of the proposed reductions in
spending to the Budget Director at least five days before the
meeting of the Legislative Finance Committee. The Committee
may make recommendations concerning the proposed reductions in spending. The Governor must consider each agency’s
analysis, the recommendations of the Budget Director, and the
Legislative Finance Committee in determining the reduction of
appropriations. The reductions must be designed to have the
least adverse impact on the provision of services determined to
be most integral to the discharge of the agency’s statutory responsibilities204 and must match the recommendations as closely as possible. The Governor shall not reduce appropriations
under this subsection by a value that exceeds the amount necessary to eliminate the budget deficit.205

§ 1-11-495(A) (2009) (“as uniformly as may be practicable”); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 43.88.110(7) (West 2010) (“across-the-board”).
202. Cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63J-1-217(3)(b) (West Supp. 2010) (directing
the executive to reduce allotments “by an amount proportionate to the amount
of the deficiency”).
203. This section borrows heavily from the language of section 17-7140(1)(b) of the Montana Code. MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-7-140(1)(b) (2009).
204. See generally State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Rockefeller, 281 S.E.2d 131
(W. Va. 1981) (invalidating public education unallotments).
205. Cf. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 291.261(2)(b) (West Supp. 2010) (“The department and the governor may not reduce allotments under this section by a
total amount that exceeds the amount necessary to bring the total estimated
General Fund ending balance to zero.”).
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(4) Nothing in this section shall affect the Legislature’s capacity to modify appropriations in accordance with legislative
standards and procedures.206
(5) Reductions shall not be used to modify, amend, or redraft statutory language and shall not apply to unencumbered
appropriations affecting [any programs the legislature expressly exempts].207
(6) If the deficit conditions of section (2) no longer exist, the
governor may restore any appropriations previously reduced
under section (3) up to its original level so long as the restoration will not create an additional budget deficit.208
C. ANALYSIS
This statute aims to improve executive branch budgetbalancing mechanisms during fiscal emergencies. Of course,
each state’s budgetary and legislative processes are statutorily
crafted in a manner unique to that state. This statute, therefore, is not exhaustive in scope. Nor would it be necessary to
enact every section. Instead, the language stands as a framework for reform.
In highlighting several specifics, the rest of this section
seeks to clarify the model statute.
1. Purpose Clause
The statutory language begins with a purpose clause. In
light of this Note’s dedication to explaining the purpose and
text of unallotment statutes, one might deem a purpose clause
unnecessary. Courts, however, have substituted the legislature’s ostensible intent with the executive’s specious plainmeaning arguments.209 While this clause remains beneficial,
the following two sections are the most essential.
206. Cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63J-1-217(3)(c) (West Supp. 2010) (“The governor’s directions . . . are rescinded when the Legislature rectifies . . . the General Fund budget deficit.”).
207. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4 -85(e) (West Supp. 2010) (exempting aid to municipalities, and legislative and judicial agencies); MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE FIN. & PROC. § 7-213(b) (LexisNexis 2009) (exempting the legislature,
the judiciary, state debt interest, public schools, salaries of public officers, and
certain state employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 704(d) (Supp. 2009) (exempting the legislature, judiciary, debt obligations, and salaries of elected officials).
208. Cf. HAW. REV. STAT. § 37-37 (2010) (“The governor at any time by executive order may restore spending authority.”).
209. See Bd. of Educ. v. Gilligan, 301 N.E.2d 911, 914 –15 (Ohio Ct. App.
1973) (finding no statutory limitation on the governor’s selective cutbacks de-
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2. Articulating Temporal Limitations
Section 2 of the model statute serves two purposes. First, it
clearly states that the governor cannot unallot until after both
the enactment of a proper budget and the beginning of the fiscal year for which the governor determines there is a budget
deficit. Commanding an executive determination that revenues
are less than needed, instead of will be less than needed,210
prohibits premature unalloting based upon the executive’s suspicion that revenue will decrease in the future. To further discourage hasty unalloting, the second purpose of section 2 is to
mandate the drawdown of a budget reserve prior to the executive’s appropriation reductions. Indeed, a reserve’s purpose is to
rectify budget shortfalls211 and to alleviate the need for what
could be economy-killing tax increases during a recession.212
This section of the model statute may endure criticism for
two reasons. First, state budgets are contingent upon future
cash flows, rather than previously acquired revenues.213 At one
moment in time, a state never has the necessary amount of
revenue in the treasury to fund the full extent of every appropriation. Accordingly, one may note the inconsistency between
this notion and the model statute because the present value of
state revenue is always less than enacted appropriations.214
While this concern proposes factual merit, it deserves greater
spite the “unlikely” chance that the legislature intended to confer such power
upon him), aff’d on other grounds, 311 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 1974).
210. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4 -85(b) (West Supp. 2010) (allowing allotment reductions when revenues “will be insufficient”); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 216.221(5)(a) (West 2010) (providing for unallotment when “a deficit
will occur”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 37-37(a) (2009) (allowing unallotment when
revenues “will be less than the amount estimated or allotted therefor”); IND.
CODE ANN. § 4 -13-2-18(f ) (LexisNexis 2002) (same).
211. Dick Thornburgh, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the Balanced Budget
Amendment: A Page of History, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 611, 616 (1988) (noting
that the purpose of budget reserves is “to set aside current revenues during good
times to be used for counter-cyclical purposes during economic retrenchment”).
212. See Tom Scheck, Some Cities Warn of Budget Cuts While Sitting on
Rainy Day Funds, MPR NEWS (Mar. 3, 2009), http://minnesota.publicradio
.org/display/web/2009/03/02/cityreserves/ (noting a Minnesota state representative’s call to tap city budget reserves to alleviate the effects of a recession,
since “[t]his is what budget reserves are for . . . to kind of ride out tough times
until the economy improves”).
213. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 730 n.180 (2002) (“[S]tate budgets are designed to balance short-term cash flows, rather than long-term present values.”).
214. See GOSLING, supra note 15, at 5 (describing “revenue constraints that
are usually tight and a budget heavily committed to the costs of ” salaries and
benefits).
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discussion. In Minnesota, Governor Pawlenty justified the fulfillment of the statutory conditions upon knowledge that the
state was “in the midst of a lengthy economic downturn,” meaning that receipts “will be less than anticipated [and] needed.”215
This would not have been such a laborious standard to satisfy
had the legislature and the governor balanced the budget prior
to unalloting.216
Second, opponents may rightfully question the policy decision to ignore a growing deficit. However, governments should
not prematurely unallot because of the uncertainty of oscillating expenditures and revenues. If nothing else, a one-time, significant unallotment at the end of the fiscal period has a higher
degree of administrative efficiency than multiple unallotments.
One suggestion to cure this predicament, which is absent from
the model statute, is to forbid unallotments until the latter half
of the fiscal year. For states with fiscal bienniums, the statute
could limit the triggering language to the second year of the biennium. Alternatively, the statute could authorize unalloting
only after the legislature adjourns sine die, thereby respecting
the legislature’s capacity to resolve the deficit. Finally, the statute could limit the length of any appropriation curtailment to
only three or four months at a time.217
3. Delegating the Appropriations Power
This section of the statute curbs discretionary appropriation reductions. As the statute’s primary delegation clause, section 3(a) prohibits arbitrary appropriation-by-appropriation
unallotments by guiding executive discretion under a three-tier
unallotment system. The governor, pursuant to the first tier,
may only reduce an appropriation by up to ten percent. Should
the state continue to confront a deficit after the governor reduces every appropriation by up to ten percent, the statute’s
second tier will emerge, in which case the governor shall then
reduce any appropriation by an additional five percent of the
215. Letter from Tom J. Hanson, Comm’r, Minn. Mgmt. & Budget, to Tim
Pawlenty, Minn. Governor 1 (June 4, 2009), available at http://minnesota
.publicradio.org/features/2009/06/04_tscheck_unallot/hansonletter.pdf.
216. See Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 368 (Minn. 2010) (“Reading
the statute to require enactment of a balanced budget as a predicate to the exercise of unallotment authority provides a definite and logical reference point
for measuring whether current revenues are ‘less than anticipated.’” (citing
MINN. STAT. § 16A.152 subdiv. 4 (2010))).
217. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24 -2-102(4) (2009) (limiting suspensions or
discontinuations of state agencies or services to three-month intervals).
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original appropriation as needed. A deficit subsequent to the
governor’s fifteen percent reduction of all appropriations, if one
exists, requires unallotments on a uniform percentage basis
until the deficit is disspelled.
One may contend that the third section would be counterproductive during excessive budget deficiencies. A provision
that emphasizes uniformly prorated unallotments appears to
be inconsistent with the first two tiers, which reduce each permissible appropriation by a set percentage.218 Although this is
true, any deficit in excess of fifteen percent of the general fund
deserves legislative attention. Section 4 further explores this
issue.
Section 3(b), mirroring Montana’s unallotment law,219 attempts to underscore governmental efficiency while still preserving separation of powers. Pursuant to this section, each
agency drafts a report that analyzes “the impact of the proposed” unallotments on subjected programs.220 An executive
budget department and a legislative oversight committee, upon
receiving copies of the report, formulate recommendations.221
Thereafter, the governor evaluates the reports and recommendations in order to implement unallotments that “have the
least adverse impact on the provision of services determined to
be most integral” to each agency.222 In practice, governors
would unallot appropriations with excess funds, rather than
from those with insufficient revenues. This method should
cause minimal inconvenience to affluent agencies while mitigating the burden on those with threatened appropriations.223
Indeed, it remains unnecessary to completely exhaust an appropriation where its purpose, such as completing a construction project, has been accomplished by expending less than the
full amount.224 To reach the same end, the model statute could
218. The statute, of course, could also continue the system of increasing
percentage caps.
219. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-7-140 (2009).
220. Supra Part III.B.3.b.
221. See supra Part III.B.3.b.
222. Supra Part III.B.3.b.
223. This method benefits states where the executive allots appropriations
over a long period, in contrast to those with quarterly or monthly allotments
that more adequately preserve funding throughout the fiscal year. See generally GOSLING, supra note 15, at 10 (noting that allotment periods range from
monthly or quarterly periods to entire fiscal years).
224. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.88.110(9) (West 2009) (“The [executive] may exempt certain public funds . . . if it is not practical or necessary
to allot the funds.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 16.50(2) (West 2009) (“If the [executive]

1104

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:1071

authorize the governor’s transfer of revenue from an affluent
fund into the general fund,225 but this proposal may face questions of constitutionality.226 In conclusion, legislatures must
strongly consider the merits of this model statute’s delegation
provision.
Although unlikely to occur, policy-driven executive actors
may still unallot funding from programs that are inconsistent
with gubernatorial initiatives.227 Two states in particular have
created expedited appeal systems that may help to avoid such
outcomes. Agency directors in Kansas and Idaho may challenge
gubernatorial budget reductions in front of, respectively, an executive228 or a legislative board.229 Meanwhile, North Dakota’s
statute sets forth standards for a legislative challenge in the
judiciary.230 In light of section 3(b)’s ample details, such a provision would appear extraneous, but nonetheless effective.231
4. Legislative Override
Pursuant to section 4, the legislature may override or modify the executive’s unallotments in a manner more consistent
with legislative intent. To do so, the legislature must be in session and must override the governor’s unallotments in accordance with its standard lawmaking procedures. It may be the
is satisfied that an estimate for any period is more than sufficient[,] . . . he or
she may modify or withhold approval of the estimate.”).
225. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24 -75-201.5(g) (West 2009) (allowing for
transfers of excess revenue from a selection of sources to the general fund for
the fiscal year 2008–2009).
226. See, e.g., Goldston v. State, 683 S.E.2d 237, 247–49 (N.C. Ct. App.
2009) (holding that only the legislature can authorize appropriations transfers
between funds).
227. A governor’s tendency to preserve his or her budgetary priorities, potentially at the expense of conflicting programs, is well established. See DALL
W. FORSYTHE, MEMOS TO THE GOVERNOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO STATE
BUDGETING 38 (2d ed. 2004) (“[F]ew governors will sacrifice their own program priorities to [unallotment].”); see also Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll,
Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 1517, 1538–39 (2009) (discussing the contention between legislatures and
the executive branch over whether governors should be able to unallot).
228. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3722 (1997) (allowing for review by the state
finance council upon agency request).
229. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-3512A (2006) (providing for a hearing before the state board of examiners upon the request of department heads).
230. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 54 -44.1-12.1 (Supp. 2009).
231. See generally Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts and the Separation
of Powers: A Venerable Doctrine in Varied Contexts, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1417, 1452–
57 (1998) (noting that courts seek to find a balance between sufficient guiding
standards and excessive oversight when considering unallotment statutes).
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case, however, that the legislature cannot reach a consensus or
cannot override a veto. Indeed, the existence of unallotment
statutes is primarily due to these circumstances.232 Still,
another positive aspect of the state budgeting process is that
legislatures appropriate new revenue each fiscal year or biennium.233 Therefore, in months’ time, the legislature can reappropriate revenue to defunded agencies.
5. Exempting Appropriations
Section 5 preserves legislative priorities before the governor can unallot. This section recognizes the legislature’s competence to conditionally exempt appropriations from unallotment
each fiscal period. Understanding the cumbersome and repetitive approach of legislating in this manner, lawmakers could
include within the statute itself programs, initiatives, or priorities that are repeatedly exempt from unallotment. In other
words, the legislature can either preserve its policy initiatives
in each fiscal period’s appropriations act or protect the most
important funding priorities when reforming its state’s unallotment law. Section 5 further prohibits the kinds of attempted
gubernatorial lawmaking and statutory modifications that
have been addressed in several cases.234
6. Executive Restoration
This final section authorizes executive action if the deficit
subsides. Should any positive balance in the state budget occur
subsequent to the appropriation reductions, the governor can
reallot appropriations to their respective agencies.235 This reauthorization of appropriations would not amount to an unconstitutional delegation of the appropriations power because gover232. See Bardsley v. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 870 P.2d 641, 646 (Colo.
App. 1994).
233. See Ronald Snell, Budgeting, State, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
TAXATION & TAX POLICY, supra note 23, at 28–29 (noting the standard state
budgeting time frames).
234. See, e.g., Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 359–62 (Minn. 2010)
(describing the governor’s series of vetoes and unallotments); Am. Fed’n of
State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. v. Olson, 338 N.W.2d 97, 98–100 (N.D. 1983) (describing the unallotments affecting legislatively appropriated salary increases
for state workers).
235. Cf. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-3512A (2006) (“The governor at any time by
executive order may restore spending authority which has been temporarily
reduced to its original level.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27B-27 (West 2010) (allowing for revisions to quarterly allotments at the executive’s discretion upon application by a requesting officer).
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nors would not be alloting appropriations in excess of their
original amount. One should be weary, however, of crafty executive actors that may use this provision to cut appropriations
uniformly only to reauthorize appropriations to programs consistent with gubernatorial initiatives. To prevent this from occurring, Florida’s statute, for instance, forbids gubernatorial
restoration of unallotments.236 As a matter of policy, states actually may choose to preserve the enacted budget cuts in order
to ensure a positive balance on the budget at the end of the fiscal year.237 Depending on a state’s aims, such a provision could
easily be inserted in lieu of section 6 of the model statute.
The preceding statute integrates unallotment’s most effective legal standards while adding further provisions to establish a paradigm for reform. Consistent with the majority of current statutes, the model statute respects the executive branch’s
capability to promulgate discretionary budget reductions. The
model statute, however, advances several mechanisms that encourage unalloting to remain consistent with legislative intent.
While other legally sound reform alternatives have merit, this
Note’s model statute is the best option for reform.
D. ALTERNATIVE AVENUES FOR REFORM
When developing a model statute, the drafter must be conscious of each state’s unique statutory and constitutional provisions. While the foregoing statute is a useful scheme for any
state to adopt, others may surmise that some alternative is a
more suitable means for reform. This section briefly proposes
several reform alternatives—single-tier unallotments, legislative confirmation, and constitutional reform—and explores the
merits and inefficiencies of each.
The first reform alternative is the development of a singletier unallotment system, which either caps appropriation reductions at a specific percentage or reduces appropriations in a
uniform manner. The benefits and disadvantages of capped and
uniformly prorated unallotments correspond to those addressed
in the model statute. Percentage cap unallotments permit executive discretion, but in doing so they establish a route to undermine legislative funding priorities. Uniformly prorated un236. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 216.221(11) (West 2010).
237. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-7-140(1)(a) (2009) (requiring spending to be reduced to “an amount that ensures that the projected ending general fund balance for the biennium will be at least 1% of all general fund appropriations”).
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allotments prohibit unbridled executive discretion, but this
comes at the cost of pitting forced budget reductions against
overextended appropriations and agencies. Deciding between
the two is, therefore, a matter of cost-benefit analysis.
The model statute, however, painstakingly accounts for
both concerns. The first two tiers encourage the executive to
unallot in a manner consistent with the legislative purpose intrinsic in the affected appropriations. Yet, the statute caps the
executive’s overall discretion to unallot at fifteen percent.
Above this level, the governor must uniformly prorate unallotments to preserve the legislature’s policymaking authority. Alternatively, other statutes provide legislatures a greater role in
the unallotment process.238
States looking to craft statutes that generate a greater legislative presence during unallotment have done so in a variety
of ways. The executive branch in Vermont has discretion to unallot certain appropriations up to five percent, but a legislative
committee must approve any cuts beyond this level.239 Florida’s
unallotment statute also provides for discretionary reductions,
but if the deficit reaches a certain level, the legislature must
resolve the crisis.240 In Kentucky, the legislature must include
a “budget reduction plan” in each budget for the executive
branch to implement.241 Several statutes even require legislative approval of any unallotment.242 Finally, Wisconsin so
strictly mandates legislative approval of unallotments that, if
necessary, governors must call a special session so that legislators can consider all proposed reductions.243 Along these lines,
one author encourages a system of legislative checks on execu238. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:75(C)(2)(e) (Supp. 2010) (requiring
approval from a legislative committee before unallotments may take effect);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 35-3-8 (Supp. 2009) (requiring the executive to submit unallotment requests to the general assembly).
239. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 704(b)(2) (Supp. 2009); see also CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4 -85(c) (West Supp. 2010) (establishing a similar procedure
in Connecticut).
240. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 216.221(6) (West 2010).
241. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48.130(1) (West 2009).
242. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.1391(3) (West 2004) (subjecting
unallotment recommendations to majority vote by a legislative committee);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:16-b (2008) (same); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 317.005
(West 2005) (same).
243. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 16.50(7)(b) (West 2009). But cf. Campbell v. White,
856 P.2d 255, 262 (Okla. 1993) (refusing to issue an opinion that would force a
special legislative session during a fiscal downturn because the “session would
be costly and might result in precious resources . . . being expended to support
the session itself ”).
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tive budgetary decisions in lieu of “micromanaging” through
traditional unallotment statutes.244 Unfortunately, a large body
of case law questions the constitutional validity of a direct legislative presence during the executive’s administration of the
budget.245
The final alternative to adoption of the model statute is
reform through the constitutional amendment process. State
constitutions that currently address executive branch unalloting promote unfettered discretion that is adverse to public policy.246 Despite this fact, constitutional reform would dispense of
all legal questions with respect to unconstitutional delegations
of legislative power. Still, while this proposal may work for several states, the practicality of multistate constitutional reform
is minimal. Although the lawmaking process is generally consistent from state to state,247 the procedures for constitutional
amendments deviate substantially.248 In fact, nineteen states
have yet to even amend their own constitution.249 In conclusion,
legislation is a much more practical agent for reform than the
constitutional amendment process.
These three alternative avenues to reform are all viable options. Single-tier unallotments, greater legislative involvement,
and constitutional reform are all more effective solutions than
the status quo. As feasible as these alternatives are, they each
lack the practicality and effectiveness of this Note’s model statute.
CONCLUSION
The heart of unallotment reform does not extend far
beyond the purview of an introductory civics class: the legislature creates the law, the executive enforces the law, and the ju244. See Rossi, Lawmaking in Crisis, supra note 20, at 274.
245. See John Devlin, Toward A State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation
of Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative
Functions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205, 1251–52 & nn.173–75 (1993) (acknowledging the mixed constitutional results of legislative finance councils and “similar
legislative bodies” with quasi-administrative functions).
246. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. IV, § 27 (conferring broad unallotment powers on the governor); N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(3) (same).
247. Victor B. Flatt, The “Benefits” of Non-Delegation: Using the NonDelegation Doctrine to Bring More Rigor to Benefit-Cost Analysis, 15 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1087, 1088 (2007) (“Similar state constitutional doctrines
underlie state lawmaking.”).
248. See Cain & Noll, supra note 227, at 1521–23.
249. See id. at 1519.

2011]

THE CLOYING USE OF UNALLOTMENT

1109

diciary interprets the law. In the age of excessive government
spending, state legislatures have bestowed upon governors the
power to reduce appropriations. Perhaps the enticement of ease
and simplicity are to blame, but as Justice Brandeis famously
stated, the objective of separation of powers is “not to promote
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.”250
The cloying use of unallotment in Minnesota, one that must not
spread throughout the United States, should not entirely overshadow the procedure’s purpose of solvency sustainment. Indeed, unallotment laws are an essential fixture within state
governments. The model statute in this Note presents a promising means of curbing the executive’s arbitrary discretion to
reduce appropriations and to amend laws in a fashion inconsistent with legislative intent. The utility of unallotment statutes
is necessarily limited because they assume financial shortcomings as a prerequisite to act. Thus, one should not see unallotment reform as the end of the debate, but rather as a useful
procedural mechanism to ensure the protection of legislative
policy initiatives during budget deficits.

250. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 85 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

